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Education and Religiosity in Budapest

Numerous clichés exist concerning the religiosity and secularisation of society in Budapest.[1][1] We tend to think that *either* the high level of secularisation simply reflects Budapest's *urban* nature[2][2] *or* the city has lost its religion as a result of the atheistic influence of the communist party state. We also aware of several specific influencing factors, such as the high ratio, historically, of Neolog and secularised Jews, the effect of rapid rural-urban migration (in excess of normal urban secularisation), and the "big city" effect as well as the arrival of new religious movements. Various further clichés exist concerning the social structure of religiosity, including the popular view that all elderly people are religious or the common belief that young people are undergoing a religious revival. An additional cliché concerns the alleged U-shaped curve of religiosity – with higher rates among poorly educated people and high school graduates, but with lower rates among skilled workers.

1[1] The study was made possible by a research grant provided by the Budapest Educational Development Foundation as well as assistance from OTKA research projects.

2[2] Budapest, the capital of Hungary has 1,590 million inhabitants in 1949 and 1,996 million inhabitants in 1994

RELIGIOSITY – IS IT MEASURABLE?

"Religiosity" is indeed a "black box". It is impossible to formulate a definition of religiosity that would be universally acceptable to theologians, psychologists and sociologists. Even if, as sociologists, we do agree upon a definition, we have to admit that we shall never be able to measure the "essence" of religiosity in a manner that would allow us to use the data in the same way as one might use data about educational qualifications or political party preferences. It is possible to measure the "manifestations of religiosity", but to do so, we must employ several indicators.

In *The Religious Factor* (Lenski, 1961), Lenski – the classical scholar of empirical religious sociology – identified four basic and distinct dimensions of religiosity: 1. religious (ritual) participation; 2. doctrinal orthodoxy; 3. religious experience; 4. self-identification as a member of the religious group. Glock and Stark (1965) argued for five dimensions: 1. ideological (religious beliefs); 2. ritual (religious practices); 3. transcendent experience; 4. intellectual (religious knowledge); 5. consequences (the effect of religiosity on lifestyle, ethics, etc.). Since Glock and Stark elaborated these five dimensions, no religious sociologist has managed to establish a more accurate mode of analysis. Thus, subsequent empirical research has tended to cite the five dimensions. (Szántó, 1997, Noffke, 2001, Tilley, 2003, Loury, 2004, Iannaccone, 2004, Bruce, 2001, Berger, 2001, Molokotos-Liederman, 2002, Sommerville, 2002, Froese, 2004, Hoge, 2004, Monahan, 2003, Phillips, 2004)

This paper seeks to place the population on a linear scale of secularisation and religiosity. In this sense, religiosity is what we call an external concept: it relates only to things that are visible "from the outside", that is, without inquiring into the content of belief. Accordingly, what we are examining can best be described using the

terms *participation*, *lifestyle and consequences for opinions*, as well as *public self-definition*. Thus, in this paper, we shall ignore not only data relating to religious experience and identification with religious beliefs, but also the presence or non-presence of religious knowledge – although the latter might well be examined in connection with education. (Evidently, knowledge of religious figures may, under certain circumstances, be greater among educated non-religious people than among poorly educated religious people – but this matter should be addressed elsewhere.)

Many issues arise in connection with "external" religiosity. The first question is to what extent respondents view themselves as religious in a society in which "church-going religiosity", "alternative religiosity", and "non-religiosity" co-exist in a socially legitimate manner and in a city where atheism has long traditions and considerable historical legitimacy – in contrast with rural areas and provincial urban centres where people may associate it with "transitory communist rule".

The second question is to what extent a respondent sees him/herself as belonging to a religious denomination or group. The third question concerns the relationship between the individual respondent and the church as a "religious institution" in the narrow sense – manifestations of which may be attendance at church services but also financial giving. The fourth question addresses the respondent's views on the role of the church in society (its political, social, and educational role, etc.). The fifth question examines the extent to which a respondent accepts, and regards as authoritative, the church's positions on issues – such as birth control – where it has clearly defined views.

The findings of the questions concerning religiosity – the "worldview" of respondents – should not be automatically interpreted as indicating denominational affiliation. Nor should one draw conclusions concerning respondents' support for, or opposition to, the various roles of the churches (established in the course of history and manifest both in the secular sphere and in the religious

sphere). We should remind ourselves that only for some religious people are institutional churches the representation of religiosity “in a worldview sense”. (For instance, non-believers in God who believe in an after-life, in spirits, in magic and in astrology are closer, on this “worldview linear scale”, to the religious pole than are non-believers in God. However, most non-believers are simply secularised people rather than conscious atheists. And for the former group, worldview and belief systems are subjectively important. In terms of consequences, therefore, the former group is actually further from the historical churches than is the latter.)

Questions concerning religious self-classification have been the subject of professional debate in recent years. According to the methods developed in public opinion research, religiosity may be defined in the following manner:

1. By questioning whether the respondent is religious or non-religious. Most Hungarian data for the 1970s is based on such questioning and, indeed, most international comparisons are made in this way. This dichotomy is in fact located in the ideological dimension of religiosity. It confuses the various forms of religiosity – which differ in terms of both participation and consequences.

2. A similar question (supplemented with the words “rather than”) can produce different results as part of a series of questions where respondents have to classify themselves on the basis of several criteria (e.g. rather rich than poor, rather right-wing than left-wing, etc.). Under such circumstances, a person’s response to a question concerning religiosity is often linked with his/her responses to previous questions. This dichotomy confuses the various forms of religiosity – which differ both in terms of participation and consequences.

3. A more informative line of questioning is to introduce the time dimension: I used to be religious, but I’m not now; I used to be religious, but I’m now; I didn’t use to be religious and I’m still not religious, I didn’t use to be religious but I’m religious now. The advantage of this

method is that by merging the appropriate categories we can form groups of people who are currently religious and non-religious without asking them a “blunt question”. We can also obtain information concerning an individual’s self-reflection on his/her secularisation over time. A serious disadvantage of this method is, however, that people who are proud of their own consistency consider specific and “verifiable” choices made over time (church school, church wedding, Communist Party membership) to be authoritative, and attempt to present such choices as consistent. Another drawback is actually linked with one of the benefits of the method – an individual’s self-reflection on his/her secularisation over time. That is to say, the respondent evaluates his sense of religiousness in relation to his own previous condition rather than in relation to the condition of his contemporaries. Faced with a dichotomatic choice, a person who never used to go to church but who now attends once a year will almost certainly classify himself or herself as “non-religious” comparing himself to a weekly churchgoers. If, however, the time dimension is also considered, the same person might possibly choose the alternative “I didn’t use to be religious, but I am now”. Since the age of a respondent is an important piece of data in any proper inquiry, the notions “previously” or “at one time” have little meaning. How can we know what a 20-year-old or a 50-year-old understands by the expression “at one time” in relation to their intellectual development?

4. A possible solution is to indicate the extent of a respondent’s religiosity on a linear (text-free) scale. For instance, we can ask people to place themselves on a scale of one to 10 – in terms of how religious they are. The drawback of such scales is that they “pull people towards the middle” (all uncertain categories move towards the centre). Moreover, even people who are sure in their beliefs will tend to avoid Category 1, because everybody knows somebody who may be even a little more religious than oneself. In terms of evaluation theory and owing to the psychological factors governing numbers and quantities, one may question whether the distance between the values 1 and 3 on the scale is the same as the distance between the values 3 and 5, etc.

5. Elemér Hankiss was the first researcher in Hungary to use a five-point scale with text. But it was Miklós Tomka's scale that became the standard, and this was the scale used by Pál Tamás in a major survey carried out in the 1990s. This was then simplified into a four-point scale in the TÁRKI omnibus monthly survey, etc. (Tomka, 1991, Tamás, 1997) As a result of the latter, a theoretical sample of a hundred thousand plus is available. (We too used it in our study to construct the "50,000" database.) Respondents selecting the category "I adhere to church teachings" tended to be religious based on other indicators too. They were more numerous than weekly churchgoers but less numerous than the combined sum of people attending church weekly or monthly. The next group – "people who are religious in their own way" comprises, in our view, an extremely diverse group of people. First, the expression "in your own way" is extremely attractive to people who consider their personal convictions to be a private matter and who do not wish, therefore, to conform to social or political expectations. (Note: society and politics in Hungary were considered to be atheistic for decades.) If we were researching the worldview of Hungarians for philosophical reasons, then we might be less concerned about the enormous differences within the group, since we could place this statement on a "materialism-idealism" scale – clearly to the benefit of the latter. But if we are investigating institutional consequences or the degree of secularisation, the usefulness of the model is quite different. As a result of differences between respondents placed in the same group, the group of people "religious in their own way – which, as we shall see, is the largest ideological group – more closely resembles, on average, the total population than does the churchgoing population. But this means the category is useless in terms of participatory and consequential religiosity. (In terms of ideological categorisation, an improvement is noticeable if we employ – as András Kovács has done – the statement "religious rather than non-religious" and Tomka's scale, thereby establishing groups on the basis of a cross-table. However, owing to the close correlation between ideology and the church as institution, this solution is incapable of offering a better evaluation.)

(Kovács, 2000.) Thus, all methods of self-classification are disputable.

Researchers debate the real social significance of responses to the question “What is your denomination?” (The debate resurfaced at the time of Hungary’s census in 2001. In light of the 15 per cent response decline rate among respondents in Budapest, there is little point in using census data.) One school of thought is that anybody who associates himself/herself with a denomination should be counted as a member of that denomination, because if the self-classification is made in an overt manner, this is equivalent to actual membership of the denomination. But what are the counter-arguments?

Whenever an interviewer fails to clarify in advance whether he/she is asking about a respondent’s registered membership of a denomination or his/her current identification with a denomination, then the piece of data received will be rather uncertain. (Although many researchers argue that this is not a problem, because for most people, registered membership of a denomination indicates the milieu in which the child grew up.) A further major reason for concern is that the structure of the question tends to encourage self-classification in one or other denomination. (The question “Are you a member of a denomination?” produces a far higher percentage of people not belonging to a denomination than does the question “Which denomination do you belong to?”.) For most respondents, naming a denomination means little more than “my parents registered me as a Catholic or a Calvinist, and I haven’t changed my religion since, I’ve not left the denomination”. In the final decades of Hungary’s “soft dictatorship”, the typical behaviour of secularised people in the country – who had been socialised by “communist consumer society” – was to “relapse” rather than “exit” from their denominations and to be passively non-religious rather than actively atheistic or anti-clerical. Further research is needed to determine what such self-classification may mean in terms of identity (and for what percentage of the population). Another intriguing question concerns the reasoning and motivation behind religious identity and self-classification. According to our structured

interviews – of a non-representative group – a possible motivation for religious identify is a desire to maintain links with the previous generation: many people express in this symbolic manner that they are still connected with their parents and grandparents – from whom they may have been painfully separated by geographical distance, educational differences, and differing value systems. Others perhaps wish to indicate shared cultural elements linking them with people of similar denominations. Acquaintance with the cultural heritage of the various denominations – the mere knowledge of "denominational" expressions such as *confirmation*, *confession*, *kipa* etc. – is the common "language" of people raised in the same denomination. (The poorly educated are more likely to know expressions used by their "own" denomination than expressions used by other denominations.) Still, ethnic research tells us that such *associations* must be treated with considerable caution: language, *knowledge* of tradition, and *identification* with a specific ethnic group or culture only partially coincide. For still others, the relevant information is not that their families are, say, traditionally Calvinist or traditionally Catholic, but that *other people in the neighbourhood, the reference group*, are not traditionally Calvinist or traditionally Catholic. That is to say, in a society which has traditionally been multi-denominational – and where there have sometimes been conflicts between, and prejudice among, the various denominations – the question "What religious denomination do you belong to?" is more likely to be answered than in uni-denominational societies where giving a response does not mean (perhaps just natural, but historically memorable) differentiation from other people, but a person's belonging to a specific denomination – the only one under consideration. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that in England many people state that they do not belong to a religious denomination, because people who do not practice their religious beliefs have nothing at all with which to "self-identify". (Bruce, 2001) Moreover, where the co-existence of denominations has been institutionalised (rather than just natural) for a long time – for instance, in the Netherlands – the ratio of negative responses is also relatively high. (Of course, differences

exist even within Hungary: a non-religious person from a Catholic family is more likely to call himself Catholic if he lives in mainly Calvinist Eastern Hungary than if he lives in mainly Catholic Western Hungary.) For still others, persecution experienced in the family – and the recollection of such persecution – serve to establish a type of "identity". Here, it does not matter that the grievances suffered by families after 1948 were ideologically motivated and *"denominationally-neutral"* rather than *denominationally-based*, the *manifestations* of such grievances were the closure of a local church group, the imprisonment of a favourite local pastor or monk, and official disapproval of church attendance and participation in religious education. Moreover, the *public debate* of grievances that were ideological rather than denominational – the passing of information to the next generation – has been conducted in the traditional denominational "language" of the aggrieved community.

We can say, therefore, that some respondents who name a denomination in response to the question "What is your denomination?" were giving technical information, while others were identifying some kind of state of consciousness, identity, cultural heritage, or *differentia specifica*.

A rather unwelcome finding is that the evaluation of the complexity of religiosity cannot be solved even at a *theoretical level*, since the complexity of the issue might only be overcome using a *multi-question* questionnaire. An apparent systemic weakness is, however, that people are more likely to refuse to respond to a questionnaire with questions on religious sociology than they are in the case of a general questionnaire of similar length – containing just *two-three* religious sociological questions.

Thus, in what follows – in stark contrast to the underlying rationale of sociological research reports and based, instead, on the methodology used in historical statistics – we shall seek answers in connection with the hypothetically formulated religious-secularisation indices

by employing various different databases.[3][3] Instead of attempting a complex analysis of these databases, we shall offer some signals taken from them.

Our point of departure is that it is needless to demonstrate that “Budapest” is more secularised than “the country as a whole”. This is an obvious fact, since 39 per cent of Budapest residents identify themselves as non-members of denominations, whereas the corresponding figure for the country as a whole is 24 per cent[4][4]; people self-identifying as non-religious represent 35 per cent of the population of Budapest but just 25 per cent of the country’s total population; 46 per cent of Budapest residents never go to church, whereas the corresponding figure for the country’s total population is 37 per cent. Thus, our paper is more concerned with the ideological divisions *within* society in Budapest – principally in connection with educational qualifications …

THE PAST AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE PRESENT

Registered membership

3[3] Our sources are as follows: 1. TÁRKI database of 3000 compiled in 1993; 2) Database of “50,000” compiled in 1997-2000 using TÁRKI omnibus survey aggregates; 3) The author’s own research on the religiosity and religious upbringing of the Budapest populace born between 1919 and 1939; 4) Own research on the religiosity and religious upbringing of the Budapest populace born between 1940 and 1959; 5) The 1993 Hungarian Institute of Educational Research survey on connections between religiosity and educational issues; 6) Own database – under compilation – on the religiosity and religious upbringing of the intellectual elite; 7) The 2002 Hungarian Institute of Educational Research survey of final-year students at teacher training colleges; 8) The 2002 Hungarian Institute of Educational Research survey of first-year university and college students.

4[4] Most of the discrepancy is due to the low level of non-membership of a denomination among rural dwellers. At the same time, there are significant differences between various urban centres in Hungary. Based on the 50,000 database, non-membership accounts for less than 20 per cent of the population in Szombathely and Kecskemét, approximately 20 per cent in Nyíregyháza and Győr, 25 per cent in Székesfehérvár, Kaposvár, Eger, Miskolc, and Zalaegerszeg, and more than 30 per cent in Tatabánya and Pécs. Figures similar to Budapest’s are found in Szeged and Veszprém. Slightly higher rates than Budapest’s 43 per cent may be observed in Debrecen and in Békéscsaba. Non-membership increases from the west towards the east, that is, from traditionally Catholic areas to traditionally Calvinist areas, and Budapest reflects this trend too. This could be the subject of a lengthier piece of research.

Our first question is how many Budapest residents are registered members of a denomination – or what is the *current memory and frame of mind* of people in connection with this.

Before we can answer these questions, we need to make sure that our databases clearly distinguish between the questions What is your religion? and Are you are registered member of a denomination? As part of the aggregated "50,000" survey, 561 people were asked this question, in order to obtain a representative response.

We found that *just 7 per cent of adult Budapest residents were not registered members of a denomination: university graduates were significantly overrepresented in this group; high school graduates were slightly overrepresented – with grammar school graduates significantly over-represented; while all other groups were underrepresented.* This means that, at least in terms of people's recollections concerning registered membership of a denomination, there is no sign of a secularised "proletariat". Indeed, if we investigate the matter by examining other educational issues, it becomes apparent that graduates of vocational schools are less likely to be registered members of a denomination than high school graduates whose schooling has been based on technical apprenticeships.

Table showing responses to the question "Are you a registered member of a denomination?" correlated with educational level (TÁRKI 50000s)

	1,00 Roman Catholic	2,00 Greek Catholic	3,00 Calvinist	4,00 Lutheran	5,00 Greek Orthodox	6,00 Jewish	7,00 Other religion	8,00 Not belong to any religion	9,00 DO NOT KNOW	Total
2,00 1-7 classes	67,6%		20,6%	5,9%	2,9%		2,9%			34

3,00 8 classes	61,9%	7,1%	22,6%	3,6%				4,8%		84
4,00 apprentice school (11 classes)	67,3%	2,8%	16,8%	6,5%				5,6%	,9%	107
5,00 Secondary school degree (12 classes)	67,9%	2,0%	16,8%		1,0%		8,7%	,5%	196	
6,00 College degree (16 classes)	69,8%	2,3%	15,1%	2,3%	1,2%	1,2%	1,2%	5,8%	1,2%	86
7,00 University degree (17 classes)	68,5%	3,7%	5,6%	9,3%				13,0 %		54
N	377	17	93	25	2	3	2	39	3	561
	67,2%	3,0%	16,6%	4,5%	,4%	,5%	,4%	7,0%	,5%	100 %

Two pieces of data are striking in respect of registered membership: the high number of university graduates among Lutherans (overrepresented by a factor of two) and the high ratio of people with no more than eight grades of education among Greek Catholics. These two data – as well as the fact that Calvinists in Budapest are slightly less educated than are Catholics, *display almost the same pattern as the last census to have been reliable in this respect, undertaken between the two world wars.* The only significant difference in relation to the censuses of 1930 and 1941 is that there is no data concerning Jewish religious affiliation. The low number of registered Jewish believers is a result of the combined effects of the Holocaust, emigration, demographic trends,

the high level of secularisation of Budapest's Jewish community, and a tendency among members of the community to conceal their religious ties. (Based on Tamás Stark's demographic estimates – which relate to the Jewish population in both a religious and ethnic sense – the estimated number of Hungarian Jews who are registered members of the Jewish denomination corresponds to 2.5 per cent of the Budapest population. (Kovács, 2002, 123) Jewish educational overrepresentation, which Viktor Karády has exposed, is in decline, with an overrepresentation index of 2.7 among university graduates, 2.2 among colleges graduates, 1.4 among high school graduates, and just 1.1 among vocational school graduates.) (Kovács, 2002, 137)

At any rate, data on registered membership – even if it has been distorted by people's selective memory – reflects whether or not a person was registered as a member of the denomination as an infant. That is to say, it can be explained primarily in terms of the religiosity and denominational affiliation of the *parents* of current residents of Budapest.

Four aspects define statements concerning non-membership:

- first, the point in time when registration "should have taken place" – as a rule, the year of birth;

- second, parental social status and religiosity or denominational membership at the time;

- third, the circumstances of childhood – reference to religious symbols, a family environment that was concerned with religion, which (even among secularised families) means that, even decades later, a respondent can

still remember which denomination he/she was a member of;

- fourth, the respondent's current "worldview", a decision (based on worldview considerations, erroneous interpretation of the question, or fear) not to reveal the denomination of which he/she was a member, even though he/she does in fact know this – declaring instead that he/she was not a registered member of a denomination.

The timing of registration

We can identify three periods of denominational membership in terms of registration.[5][5] The first period lasts until 1947. During this period it was rare for a child not to be registered. The second period is the decade from 1948 until 1957 – a period when religious repression was most severe. Despite such repression, just one in twenty people now living in Budapest who were born (in Budapest or elsewhere in the country) during this period were not registered. At the time, communist party membership among the population of "parental age" exceeded 10 per cent. Although the Hungarian Workers' Party (the official name of communists 1948-1956, led by Stalinist politicians) was extremely anti-clerical (more anti-clerical than its successor the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, led by János Kádár, 1956-1988), nevertheless non-registration was not typical even among party members.

In the following decade and a half, the non-membership ratio increases to one in nine or one in eight. This cannot be the result of secular *education* earlier on, since the parents of children conceived in the late 1950s

5[5] If we were to cite all the tables used, there would be pages and pages of figures. The tables serving to back up the arguments put forward in this study may be found at the following website http://nagypetertibor.uni.hu/ or, in the event of this page being unavailable, in the Hungarian Electronic Library, which is a section of the webpage of the Hungarian National Library. http://mek.oszk.hu/

must have attended compulsory classes in religious education while they were at school. And yet the ratio of registered membership is no higher among this group than it is among children conceived a decade and a half later – whose parents had doubtless been members of the state-run Communist Pioneer Movement and who may or may not have attended classes in religious education.

Instead, the explanation would seem to be the *general secularisation* of the parental generation, the general advance of secularisation among society in Budapest. Moreover, a decline in rural-urban migration prevented the delayed secularisation of rural areas from having an effect.

The fourth generation visible in this database, comprises respondents born in the mid-1970s – 28 per cent of whom were non-members of a denomination.

Parental "worldview" at the time of registration

Respondents cannot know their parents' sense of religiousness at the time of registration, but some researchers have asked respondents to recall how often their parents attended church when they were 10 years old and whether or not their parents brought them up religiously and sent them to classes in religious education at school or church. Assuming that respondents as children had a worldview similar to that of children who were 10 years older, we can deduce that, at the time of birth, one in seven children born in Budapest around 1945, one in four born in the 1950s, and 43 per cent born in the 1960s, had mothers who never attended church -and their fathers were no more religious. The children of non-churchgoers are almost three times more likely than average not to be members of a religious denomination. A further indication of secularisation is that in the early 1990s, on average, 30 per cent of respondents born in Budapest had parents living in mixed marriages, whereas this was true of 56 per cent of non-members of denominations. Thus, the increase,

from generation to generation, in the proportion of mixed marriages leads to a corresponding increase in the likelihood of non-membership of a denomination. (TARKI3000)

Religious socialisation

Although almost every child was registered as a member of one or other denomination, nevertheless wide differences could be observed in the extent of a child's religious upbringing.

The religious socialisation of people living in Budapest – including religious education at school or church – is obviously closely connected to whether or not they spent their childhood in Budapest or elsewhere in the country.

For the generation born prior to 1943, the situation is a simple one, as they were required by law to attend classes in religious education. (Religious education was compulsory in Hungary until 1949.) In the late 1940s, religious education became voluntary throughout the developed world. As a result, both long-term and short-term secularisation trends accelerated. In Hungary too, the number of children attending classes in religious education began to fall. In Budapest, a series of processes were underway – which individually were hardly recognisable. First among these was that religious education was no longer compulsory for the Budapest populace. *Even prior to this* the secularised population had often chosen the non-clerical political alternative: the results of the secret multi-party elections held in 1939, 1945 and 1947 demonstrate that parties appealing to "Christian" voters always fared worse in Budapest than they did elsewhere in the country. This is supported by the fact that despite the presence of denominational schools, many Budapest parents in the 1930s and 1940s sent their children to non-denominational schools or to schools run by other denominations; moreover, the rate of mixed marriages was

much higher in Budapest than it was elsewhere. Contemporary and retrospective surveys both show far lower rates of church attendance for Budapest than for other areas of the country.

Second, many factors point to the secularisation of the younger generation, which although it brought up religiously nevertheless had recently experienced the world war and the siege of Budapest. This secularisation was noticeable in children reaching school age in the late 1940s and in the larger cohort born in 1946.

Third, the large numbers of young people coming to Budapest due to reconstruction efforts and rapid industrialisation were less likely, when they became parents, to send their children to classes in religious education than they would have been if they had still been living at home, in the villages. There are many reasons for this; the absence of the older generation significantly reduced the power of traditional norms. Local community influence was a further motivation that was markedly absent. In rural areas, many villages had just one school, which was attended by all children in the village. And people made note of the customs and behaviour of other villagers. But another factor – recollected by respondents – was the absence of a familiar priest who could be charged with the religious education of the children. The social class of traditional skilled workers, which served as a reference group for unskilled workers and new skilled workers, did not send children to classes in religious education, owing to secularising traditions that went back decades. The urban lifestyle – even in its rather “bare” form – had a secularising influence; young people from rural areas settling in Budapest were more likely to marry someone of a different denomination – and this also had a secularising effect.

The fourth factor – one that worked in combination with the above processes – was that it was particularly clear to people living in Budapest, the country’s political power centre, that the human skills and moral behaviour that one could learn by attending classes in religious education – formerly, a prime motive for attending such

classes – were no longer required in the new political system. Moreover, the effect of a dualistic institutional upbringing (religious instruction and communist indoctrination within the Pioneer Movement) could actually unsettle children. Another difference between school attendance in Budapest and school attendance in rural areas was that village schools had been run – until shortly before – by religious denominations. Consequently, teachers at such primary schools — who remained in their posts even under the new political system — had formerly been employed by the religious denominations. Thus, parents in rural areas correctly perceived that their children could, in all likelihood, continue to attend classes in religious education without suffering negative effects in terms of their academic results or their integration at school. (Since 1938 there had been no unemployment among primary school teachers in Hungary. The population could therefore comfortably assume that a teacher could easily have moved to another school if he/she did not like the “excessive” influence of the religious denomination maintaining the school.) For this very reason, the difference in 1950—51 may be regarded as the *combined effect* of secularisation and administrative excesses.

A fifth peculiarity was that educational opportunities and subsequent possibilities were more clearly visible in Budapest than elsewhere in the country. People were therefore less inclined to risk losing such opportunities.

A sixth motive was that parents in urban areas were more likely (as factory workers rather than as peasant farmers or agricultural co-operative workers) to weigh up the negative consequences – on their own careers – of their children attending classes in religious education.

Finally, a seventh factor should also be considered: namely, administrative measures taken by the state with the intention of preventing parents from sending their children to classes in religious education.

The various factors outlined above can be distinguished – at least at a symbolic level – in the

structured interviews at our disposal. But the data are clearly insufficient for an appraisal of their relative effect.

What is certain, however, is that attendance began to decline as soon as religious education became voluntary. The official figures show that in the 1950—51 academic year, 72 per cent of primary school students attended classes in religious education. But the figure was just 9.8% in Budapest. (Gergely: 1995:142) [6][6]

But the decline in attendance accelerated after the introduction – in the autumn of 1950 – of a comprehensive policy to stamp out religious education. As a result, in 1951, the national participation rate fell to just 26.4 per cent, while in Budapest as few as 1.8 per cent of primary school pupils attended classes in religious education at school. (Izsák: 1985:457) (In Budapest the rate subsequently fell by a further one-third.) (Források: 50) In the 1952—53 academic year, pupils attending classes in religious education accounted for just 1.5 per cent of the total. As a result of additional anti-clerical pressure, the rate fell to just one-quarter of its previous level in 1953—54. In 1953, prior to the entry into office of Imre Nagy's government, just 665 pupils enrolled in classes in religious education in Budapest, even though there were in total 175,000 primary school pupils. If this figure is accurate, then by this time the attendance rate in Budapest had fallen to less than 0.5 per cent. The national average, meanwhile, was 13 per cent.

The suppression of religious education at school meant that religious education at church-building became increasingly important. Indeed, the number of first communicants in Budapest actually increased from just 4144 in 1952/53 to 7776 in 1953/54. While children attending classes in religious education at school could be

6[6] Moreover the percentage differed significantly in the various districts of Budapest. The highest attendance rates were seen in Districts III, XIV, XVIII, and XIX, where 20 per cent or so of pupils attended classes in religious education. Meanwhile, the lowest rates were registered in Districts VIII, XV, and XVII, where just 3 per cent or so of children attended such classes (Források: 49).

counted in their hundreds, state statistics – issued by an officer responsible for church-state relation - indicate as many as 37,202 children involved in “various religious classes”.

Attendance levels in religious education were influenced not just by the “general atheism” of the communist system, but also by specific policies of the communist party and government. The effect of a change in government — the entry into office of reformist Prime Minister Imre Nagy — was immediate. In August 1953, supplementary enrolments in religious education were held. Enrolment rates increased by a factor of ten in Budapest and by a factor of two in the country as a whole (Balogh—Gergely: 1993:306). Following the open conflicts of Stalinist and reform-forces, by the spring of 1954, attendance in Budapest had fallen to 50 per cent of the enrolment rate. In the 1954—55 academic year, the religious education attendance rate rose to 35.7 per cent nationally and to 7.7 per cent in Budapest (Izsák: 1985:457). And in 1955, the national rate allegedly reached 40 per cent (Tomka: 1991:32). A further change in policy resulted in a renewed decline. Thus, in 1956, the enrolment rate was 30.18 per cent nationally and 6.9 per cent in Budapest (Izsák: 1985:457). (For the following decade, the statistics do not provide separate figures for Budapest, but it would seem certain that the attendance rate in Budapest was consistently lower than the national rate (1960: 25 per cent, 1965:10 per cent, 1971: 9.7 per cent, 1975: 6.9 per cent, 1980: 4.36 per cent, 1985: 3.41 per cent) (Tomka, 1991).)

If we now examine respondents’ recollections, our attention turns to the whole of childhood. This means we obtain a higher positive ratio in response to our question concerning whether or not a respondent attended classes in religious education, than the above cited. As regards the 1950s, three subgroups are identifiable within Budapest society. Accordingly, classes in religious education were attended by: four in five children of poorly educated parents; one in two children of fathers with eight grades of

primary school or four grades of civil school[7][7] plus apprenticeship school; just 28 per cent of children of parents with high school education or higher. Examining parental employment, we identify an almost consistent pattern; the higher a father was placed in the employment hierarchy in Budapest in the 1950s, the less likely he was to send his child to classes in religious education. Using this mode of analysis and given the same size of sample, the higher level of religiosity of the “old” social groups is reflected only in the behaviour (higher levels of attendance of classes in religious education) of children of craftsmen and merchants. In our other survey – which mobilised a greater number of intellectuals – a greater demand for classes in religious education is characteristic of the traditional intellectual professions (e.g. teaching and medicine).

The political debate surrounding religious education (which in around 1952 seamed to be a “prohibition”) concealed to contemporaries the fact that the decline in attendance was not (only) the result of political developments but the effect of a more profound social process: advancing secularisation.

Another survey [8][8]examined church attendance among the parents of people living in Budapest. As far as fathers in Budapest are concerned, non-churchgoers accounted for a half of the lower social groups, where unskilled workers and skilled workers are equally secularised.[9][9] Slightly more than one in four high school graduates belonged in this group. When, however, we

7[7] „Polgári iskola”, bürgerschule, a lower secondary school for the 10-14, without latin, for lower middle class and workers till 1945, when it was replaced by the general school.

8[8] – which we have not yet mentioned but was made possible through grants provided by the Soros Foundation, the National Scientific Research Fund (OTKA), and the Foundation for Hungarian Higher Education and Research (AMFK) –

9[9] In the original questionnaires, older people were confronted with responses (concerning educational background) that made sense only from the 1960s. The expression “vocational school graduate” could however be identified by older people – especially those living in Budapest – with the apprenticeship schools that were popular in Budapest before World War II. Primary school education for elderly people could mean four civil school classes – whose equivalence with primary school education, respondents “could have learnt” in five censuses – or workers’ primary school.

examined the fully secularised group and those who attended religious services once a year, we found the characteristic U-shaped curve, with secularised people accounting for somewhat less than 60 per cent of the poorly educated at the very bottom of society. This figure increased to 66.3 per cent among skilled workers; it fell once again among high school graduates.

Religious education at school[10] ***[10]*** *— attendance by type of settlement*

	1949/55	1956/60	1961/65	1966/70	1971/75	1976/80	1981/84
Country	80,1	68,7	49,8	35,1	28,4	15,8	15,5
Budapest	57,5	44,0	25,5	9,7	9,4	7,5	2,2
Cities[11]	70,8	45,5	16,2	9,1	7,7	7,7	5,0
Towns	78,7	60,0	36,2	15,2	13,2	9,8	8,2
Villages	85,6	81,3	65,3	51,3	42,1	22,6	30,4
N	327	330	388	323	266	301	226

(Tárki, 3000)

According to the data (the ten-year “staggered”[12] table of data, or the graph based on such) the curves for

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10[10] An affirmative response to the question “Did you attend classes in religious education when you were 10 years old?”. The 1956/60 group comprises individuals born between 1946 and 1950; the Budapest group comprises respondents that lived in Budapest during *childhood*.

11[11] There are no real cities in Hungary except Budapest. Som ebig town, which has similar selfgovernment as a county, called city, in this text.

12[12] This means that we examined separately the data characteristic of those born between 1930 and 1939 and those born between 1931 and 1940, and then placed them in a crosstable.

urban areas — major urban centres and Budapest — cluster together over the long term. Generally speaking, in urban areas, the decline continues at the same rate until the 1960s but then slows down. Observing the entire period, we find that whereas at the beginning of the communist era the difference between Budapest and the cities was greater than the difference between these latter urban centres and rural areas (other urban centres being somewhere between the two), by the end of the period the rate was about the same in all urban settlements; and since the rate of secularisation was lower in rural areas, the difference between urban and rural areas actually grew.

Half of Budapest fathers were fully secularised in the 1960s and 1970s, and more than two-thirds were fully secularised in the 1980s – based on the assumption that a person who never attends religious services is fully secularised. To be noted is that fathers who were vocational school graduates or vocational college graduates (presumably mostly industrial technical colleges) were overrepresented throughout the period, while, as the years passed, the secularisation of fathers who were university graduates gradually approached the urban average. A majority of urban dwellers, as well as dominant groups of urban dwellers, became increasingly secularised – although a churchgoing group could still be found among the intellectual elite.

RELIGIOSITY IN 2000

The religiosity of Budapest's current population was thus influenced/determined by childhood religious education, parental example, and the secularising effect of years/decades of adult life.

We can examine this religiosity by separating it into several factors:

Statement indicating religious affiliation

The table below informs about the religious affiliation of Budapest's current population, based on large-scale absolute numbers.

Religious affiliation[13] ***[13]*** *correlated with education in Budapest*

	,00	1,00 Roman Catholic	2,00 Greek Catholic	3,00 Calvinist	4,00 Lutheran	5,00 Greek Orthodox	6,00 Jewish	7,00 Other religion	8,00 Not belong to any religion	9,00 DO NOT KNOW	Total	Total
-00		,0%		,1%					,1%		,0%	4
1,000 class		,1%							,0%		,1%	5
2,001-7 classes	4,1%	7,0%	13,0%	7,5%	5,6%	9,1%	2,4%	6,9%	2,6%		5,3%	506
3,008 classes	20,9%	16,9%	29,3%	18,3%	16,5%		17,1%	16,3%	13,6%		16,0%	1523
4,00 apprentice school (11 classes)	16,3%	17,1%	15,4%	18,7%	14,3%	18,2%	14,6%	16,3%	17,2%	50,0%	17,2%	1639
5,00 Secondary school degree (12 classes)	30,6%	34,4%	30,1%	32,2%	30,7%	27,3%	41,5%	36,3%	39,1%	25,0%	35,8%	3411
6,00 Colleg	14,8%	13,2%	6,5%	13,8%	16,9%	18,2%	7,3%	16,3%	14,9%	25,0%	14,0%	1334

13[13] In the 33 surveys that were used to construct the 50,000 database, we considered that the following alternatives could be merged: "Do you belong to a church?" "Do you belong to one of the churches?" "And do you belong to one of the churches?". Questions concerning "registration as a member" were not placed in this group.

e degree (16 classes)												
7,00 University degree (17 classes)	13,3 %	11,3 %	5,7%	9,5%	16,0 %	27,3%	17,1 %	8,1%	12,5 %		11,6 %	1105
	100, 0%	100, 0%	100, 0%	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %	100, 0%	100, 0%	100, 0%	100, 0%	100, 0%	9527
N	196	3991	123	1083	231	11	41	160	3687	4	9527	

Almost two-fifths of Budapest's current population do not belong to any religious denomination – this average figure is determined by the level of secularisation, which rises in correlation with the level of education. Thus, the non-membership ratio is 4-5 per cent above average among high school and university graduates; it is about average among those with a vocational school education; and it is just 5 per cent from the average among those with a primary school education. Meanwhile, the secularised ratio is less than one-fifth among poorly educated people – but this socio-educational group is dominated almost exclusively by the elderly.

We can also form several larger age-groups. Non-members of religious denominations (the secularised group) account for one-sixth of those born before or during the First World War and for one-quarter or one-fifth of those born in the decade after the First World War.

The generation, one-third of which does not belong to a religious denomination, covers those born in the years before the Great Depression until 1945. For subsequent generations – who clearly could not have attended compulsory classes in religious education – until those born in the early 1970s, we may estimate the non-membership ratio to be at least two-fifths of the population – thereafter rising to 50 per cent among the generation born in the 1970s and early 1980s. (The percentage of those belonging to "other religious groups" – whose rapid growth was described in such dramatic terms by publications that

feared the loss of influence of the New Religious Movements – “jumps” to 3 per cent among the generation born in the 1960s, but then declines to just 1.5 per cent among those born in subsequent decades...)

The participatory dimension

Church attendance is the most important piece of data concerning participation.

Frequency of church attendance and education (TÁRKI 50000)

	,00 never	1,00 once a year, or less frequent	2,00 several times in a year	3,00 once a month	4,00 several times a month	5,00 once per week, or more frequent	N	
-1,00	100,0 %						4	100,0 %
1,00 0 class	40,0%		20,0%			40,0%	5	100,0 %
2,00 1-7 classes	35,9%	20,6%	19,8%	6,7%	5,8%	11,1%	504	100,0 %
3,00 8 classes	43,8%	22,9%	19,4%	3,9%	3,6%	6,3%	1519	100,0 %
4,00 apprentice school (11 classes)	49,9%	23,1%	17,8%	2,1%	2,1%	5,0%	1628	100,0 %
5,00 Secondary school degree (12 classes)	46,9%	21,8%	17,7%	2,9%	2,4%	8,2%	3388	100,0 %
6,00	44,6%	17,8%	19,2%	3,7%	2,7%	12,1%	1319	100,0

College degree (16 classes)								%
7,00 University degree (17 classes)	46,5%	15,0%	18,2%	3,5%	2,9%	13,9%	1090	100,0 %
N	4349	1967	1736	313	267	823		
	46,0%	20,8%	18,4%	3,3%	2,8%	8,7%	9457	100,0 %

Concerning weekly church attendance, we can identify a clear U-shaped curve, with skilled workers being the most secularised group. In national religious sociological analyses, the U-shaped curve is higher on the poorly educated side, owing to the rural population; but in Budapest, university graduates are the most frequent churchgoers. Excluding the very elderly, among whom weekly church attendance (14%) is close to the urban average, as far as middle-aged and young people are concerned, university graduates are *overrepresented* by a factor of 1.5 among weekly churchgoers. We find this overrepresentation among the most secularised group too – those born between 1955 and 1965: whereas 5.4 per cent of the generation are weekly churchgoers, the figure is 8.6 per cent among university graduates. University graduates of this generation employed in the health sector are particularly keen churchgoers (with 28 per cent of them attending church weekly).

There is a far strong correlation than the urban average between the political sympathies of university graduates and weekly church attendance: graduates voting for leftwing parties are underrepresented by a factor of 5 among weekly churchgoers, while the average is underrepresented by a factor of just 2.5. A “Christian intellectual” class has now become a political reality in Hungary – far more so than a Christian middle class…

On the other side, *we do not see a reverse U-shaped curve* for those never going to church: those who attended vocational school are the most secularised, but they are closely followed by high school and university graduates; the low score of poorly educated people is linked with their advanced age. *Non-attendance at church corresponds with the statement "I am not religious" to a greater degree among educated people than it does among poorly educated people*.

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Self-classification

Concerning religious self-classification, the reverse U-shaped curve prevails only among churchgoers. On the other side, the *percentage of those declaring themselves to be non-religious increases with the level of education*. If, however, we limit the sample to those born after 1940, we can perceive a far more homogenous non-religious block from skilled workers to university graduates, amongst whom those who attended vocational secondary school are particularly secularised.

Religious self-classification and education (Tárki 50000)

	-	,0	1	2,	3,		
	1,00	0 not religious	,00 Do not know	00 Religious on my own way	00 Follow the church		
	-	5		5		10	4
1,00		0,0%		0,0%		0,0%	
	1	2		4	4	10	5
,00	0	0,0%		0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	
class							
	2	,	1	2	5	2	10	5

,00	1-7 classes	6%	4,6%	,4%	9,5%	2,9%	0,0%	06			
,00	3 8 classes	, 6%	2 7,1%	4 ,3%	5 6,9%	1 1,2%	10 0,0%	523	1		
,00	4 apprentice school (11 classes)	, 6%	3 5,9%	4 ,8%	5 2,3%	6, 3%	10 0,0%	639	1		
,00	5 Secondary school degree (12 classes)	, 8%	3 7,4%	4 ,8%	4 7,9%	9, 1%	10 0,0%	411	3		
,00	6 College degree (16 classes)	1 ,2%	3 7,4%	3 ,9%	4 4,6%	1 2,9%	10 0,0%	334	1		
,00	7 University degree (17 classes)	1 ,8%	4 0,4%	3 ,9%	3 8,1%	1 5,8%	10 0,0%	105	1		
	N	, 9% 8 6	3 4,6% 3 298	4 ,4% 3 16	4 9,1% 4 678	1 1,0% 4 049	10 0,0% 1	527	9		

Most Budapest inhabitants are religious in their own way, and do not attend church regularly in accordance with the norms of the churches. University graduates are drawn to both extremes: churchgoers are overrepresented but so are those who consider themselves to be non-religious. Since society usually perceives itself through the

reflections of its intellectual opinion-formers, Budapest society may appear to be more divided than it really is.

The consequential dimension

A respondent's naming a denomination infers some kind of minimum "group identity", the frequency of church attendance reflects the respondent's "participation" level, and his/her "self-definition" of religiousness will inform about a respondent's world-view, but none of this tells us the extent to which people adhere to the teachings of the church when making life choices – or the extent to which they may have set out on the path to secularisation.

Analyses of the consequential dimension usually try to link many different types of consequences (political views, ethical ideas) with religiosity. This is the correct approach in societies where churches have continuously affected the way people live their lives: for instance, in the case of a Dane or Dutchman, at every stage of life he will have been aware of the existence of a historical church norm, from which all larger groups (ultimately the minority) have diverged, but behaviour contrary to the church norm never became the norm followed by schools or by the public administration. even when it was clear that it had become the norm of the majority. In Hungary's case, however, even though overt hostility towards religion prevailed only during a part of the period 1949-1989, the state, school or workplace could never have been considered neutral in terms of its worldview.

As a result, rather than examine *all* the factors that *may* stand in opposition to churchgoers' positions (based on experience), we should concentrate instead *on those factors that are definitively*, expressly and recognisably in opposition to the conduct expected by the churches – above all the historical churches.

As far as certain key lifestyle issues are concerned, the opinion of the churches – in particular that of the Catholic Church, which accounts for the great majority of churchgoers in Budapest – may be regarded as fully known to the public.

The major issues under consideration are found in the field of sexual theology and religious ethics: for example, the church's position on (generally speaking, its prohibition of) abortion, birth control, extra-marital sex, divorce, sex before marriage, and cohabitation.

Based on public opinion research undertaken in recent years, we may state that *many churchgoers do not accept the guidance provided by the churches in these areas.*

Most instances of diversion from the norms of sexualxual theology and religious ethics (single unmarried, married with spouse, single or remarried widow, married person whose spouse has abandoned him or her and who is therefore living alone "through no fault of his/her own") concern differences in the actual or formal family status.

The connection between family status and religiosity

	-1,00	,00 not religious	1,00 Do not know	2,00 Religious on my own way	3,00 Follow the church		N
-1,00	2,3%	,1%		,1%	,1%	,1%	11
1,00 non-married, living alone	16,3%	20,7%	26,2%	13,1%	13,9%	16,4%	1562
2,00 non-married, living together	1,2%	4,1%	3,8%	2,7%	1,0%	3,0%	289
3,00 married, living with his	54,7%	51,1%	45,2%	48,3%	44,9%	48,8%	4650

wife/her husband							
4,00 married, living together not his wife/her husband	1,2%	1,7%	1,2%	2,1%	1,1%	1,8%	174
5,00 married, living alone	2,3%	1,4%	2,2%	1,5%	1,0%	1,5%	139
6,00 divorced, living alone	14,0%	10,1%	9,4%	10,9%	7,1%	10,2%	968
7,00 divorced, living together		2,3%	2,6%	1,9%	,3%	1,9%	180
8,00 widow, living alone	8,1%	8,1%	9,4%	18,4%	29,9%	15,7%	1491
9,00 widow, living together		,5%		,8%	,6%	,7%	63
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
N	86	3298	416	4678	1049	9527	

Examining the various forms of family status that do not conform to the norms of sexual theology and religious ethics, we find that one in ten churchgoers do actually belong in this category. This is approximately half of the average for Budapest. Deviators from the norm are present in all educational subgroups of churchgoers; the difference between the Budapest average and the rate for churchgoers is the smallest among vocational school graduates and college graduates. Vocational school or college education is the least common among the elderly, since such forms of institutional education became widespread only in the 1950s, and the increase in the share of college graduates in relation to university graduates is a post-1945 phenomenon. At the same time,

among skilled workers and college graduates, religiosity has a greater influence on family status, if we limit the sample to those born after 1950. (By doing so, however, we exclude most of those who once had spouses but whose spouses have died.)

In an objective sense, deviators from the norm must account for more than one in ten churchgoers and one in five of the total Budapest population, since, according to this logic, divorced but remarried churchgoing Catholics were placed among the group of married persons living with their spouses. *Sexual theology's ban (in the case of the Protestant churches, restriction) on divorce and extra-marital cohabitation appears to influence churchgoers in such a way that in a consequential sense we may consider them as religious.*

Followers of church teachings *do in fact restrict the number of their children*. There is no other explanation for the fact that 29 per cent of churchgoers are childless or that 24 per cent have just one child, despite the fact that the average age of churchgoers is ten years older than the average age of total Budapest residents – so that most of them are too old to have any more children.

Whereas the number of children and family status demonstrate aspects of consequential religiosity that are not necessarily conscious ones (that is to say, a person may become divorced without actually being in favour of divorce), questions relating to *opinions* – whether concerning sexual theology or any other issue – do render the self-definition of churchgoers and their contrary attitudes and thoughts even more striking, because in this area the juxtaposition of *opinions* cannot be avoided.

Such questions have been asked in only a few public opinion research surveys.[14][14] Thus, whereas a correlation between family status and religious self-definition has been

14[14] This signifies the various TÁRKI omnibus surveys. The questions can be identified based on the character sign at the TÁRKI website. http://www.tarki.hu/index-e.html To find out which, see the crosstables viewable on the website http://nagypetertibor.uni.hu or http://mek.oszk.iif.hu/

demonstrated quite accurately in a sample of ten thousand, if we address these issues separately, then we tend to be left with samples of just a few hundred respondents. Nevertheless, the impressions received are important and unambiguous.

One-third of churchgoers do not reject *pre-marital cohabitation*. (TÁRKI-ZD55B[15][15]) Churchgoers are therefore more conservative than the Budapest average – one-half of Budapest residents express support for pre-marital cohabitation. Nevertheless, churchgoers are not nearly as conservative as one might conclude based on sexual theology.

Forty-six per cent of churchgoers who follow church teachings consider *extra-marital childbearing* as irresponsible. Thus, in this area, they are twice as strict as the Budapest average. (TÁRKI - ZD54) But this also means that only one in two churchgoers adheres to sexual theology's position on this issue. Fourteen per cent think that a desire to bear children leads to this condition – thus here too, they are overrepresented by a factor of almost 1.5. The spousal relationship can be made better by having a child say 11 per cent of them – just one-quarter of the Budapest average. *One in ten churchgoers express a position that is clearly contrary to religious ethics. Extra marital childbirth* – according to another survey – is not rejected by a significantly greater number (63%) than the Budapest average (61 %). Moreover, 25 per cent of Budapest churchgoers admit that they do not agree at all with the view that children should only be born in marriage. This question, posed in a slightly different context, indicates that the consequentially religious group is even smaller than we had thought.

Seventy per cent of followers of church teachings consider *contraceptives* to be useful. This ratio is only slightly less than the Budapest average of 80 per cent (TÁRKI QC54a). An overwhelming majority are in favour of funding for contraceptives.

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The most obvious discrepancy, however, concerns the issue of abortion, where the position of the Catholic church – a complete ban – and that held by most other historical churches is unambiguous, but where followers of church teachings do not adhere to such a position. On a ten-point scale, less than 17 per cent of churchgoers (20 per cent of Catholics) support a complete ban on abortion. (TÁRKI U2509) Although this ratio is far higher than the Budapest average (3.8 per cent), it nevertheless represents merely a small minority. Based on a slightly different question, 20 per cent of churchgoers (Budapest average: 10 per cent) are in favour of a ban on abortions. (TÁRKI-Qc53) Based on yet another question (Is abortion acceptable today?day? day?day?), 46 per cent of churchgoers selected a statement expressing "complete rejection" – twice as many as the average – while, on the other hand, 21 per cent selected a statement expressing "full acceptance" (while the Budapest average was also just 31 per cent). (TÁRKI ME55A) Moreover, just one-third of churchgoers were in favour of tougher laws governing abortion. (TÁRKI MI44H) In response to the question "With whom should a decision concerning abortion be discussed?", no more than twenty pehurchgoers stated "the Church" (TÁRKI-Qc47e).

In a survey concerning people's confidence in various institutions, respondents in another sample were asked to rate various organisations, the government, courts of law, trade unions, and churches (TÁRKI-QK32b). In this survey, less than 70 per cent of churchgoers stated that they had full confidence in the churches. Although this figure amounted to almost five times the urban average, nevertheless it shows that even followers of church teachings do not universally trust the churches.

* * *

By way of summary we conclude that Budapest is a metropolis whose middle classes are fairly secularised, but whose intellectual elite is sharply divided into a secularised

atheistic majority and a religious minority that is overtly religious and assigns political value to its views. At the same time, between 10 and 30 per cent of churchgoers have views that conflict with conventional sexual theology.

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